The main premise of the two articles are, that the seemingly equality-seeking practices of the professional fields are in other ways enhancing the inequality. Amy Slaton takes engineering education as the case where the UIC accepted minority students inclusively for entrance, but systematically excluded them from becoming professionals by not changing the existing standards in the curriculum. Though the justification for such open exntrance policy was to have more variety and thus train more competent professionals, it turned out the opposite. In Avery Gordon's piece, he criticizes the 'diversity management' practice in the corporate 'culture', which was a shift from the previous affirmative action paradigm. Though this paradigm was implemented to overcome affirmative action's limits such as the assimilation rule, it shows its own limits by assuming that diversity can be managed, and ultimately justifying racist outcomes such as stereotyping as well as a return to assimilation.
In any case, the very effort of the management or institution to separate unequal conditions such as race, class and gender actually contribute to strengthening it by making it look 'neutral' - and by this, hiding the clearly existing connections. This premise is linked to the main argument of this class: the need to uncover hidden systems in labor. Complicated as it may be, the stratifications among various lines and the interaction among them that result in inequity should be revealed, acknowledged and remedied as it is.
However, balacing it out with the professional need for efficiency is another thing. As mentioned in the texts, even equality is only pursued in those fields because it contributes for more (sometimes long-run) efficiency. How can be the uncoveing of hidden labor practices and systems be justified in terms of efficiency? Or how can it replace that firmly existing discourse? A large question to ask, but a crucial problem to think of if these discussions are to spread beyond the academic table.
Monday, March 26, 2007
Monday, March 19, 2007
On Sorting Things Out...
Bowker and Star's emphasis on the importance of categorization in Sorting Things Out reminded me strongly of Foucault's description on the history of 'madness'. The power to name things is the first step for control, and thus it is important to look into the history of the knowledge to uncover the truth about the governance structure we are embedded in. In his vein, the authors argue that categorization is ubiquitous and crucial in the human society (And indeed, formal knowledge in our modern westernized world is all about classification). In part I, they go over the system and history of ICD in great lengths to prove this point, while in part IV they cover the actual work of categorization. Ironically, the main argument of the authors is that those categories are never as solid or uniform as they seem.
One interesting thing that struck me the most is the crucial role invisibility of the classification work plays in the power of the categories. In the various 'hidden' labor we have been dealing with during this semester, their labor was hidden for the benefit of the others. However, in this case the classification labor can benefit itself by staying in the shadow. The more hidden it stays, the more power the classification gets, so to say. But what about the struggle to bulid new standards of classification? I would assert that a challenging party gains more power by publicly uncovering the hidden classifications. Is it the dynamic that the once the challenging classification chooses to go back to the shadows after it has become the leading principle?
Also, the notion of the Aristotelean and prototypical categories was a intersting subject. Though we imagine to achieve the former, the actual outcomes are closer to the latter. One thing, though, I would like to ask is how the prototypes are set. Aren't the prototypes actually some forms of ideals that have sprung out from relational concepts, as the French structualists have argued? It sounds like a chicken-and-egg problem, but maybe the real important thing is that the very aspiration of the current paradigm of classification to achieve some form of 'Aristotelean' categories.
One interesting thing that struck me the most is the crucial role invisibility of the classification work plays in the power of the categories. In the various 'hidden' labor we have been dealing with during this semester, their labor was hidden for the benefit of the others. However, in this case the classification labor can benefit itself by staying in the shadow. The more hidden it stays, the more power the classification gets, so to say. But what about the struggle to bulid new standards of classification? I would assert that a challenging party gains more power by publicly uncovering the hidden classifications. Is it the dynamic that the once the challenging classification chooses to go back to the shadows after it has become the leading principle?
Also, the notion of the Aristotelean and prototypical categories was a intersting subject. Though we imagine to achieve the former, the actual outcomes are closer to the latter. One thing, though, I would like to ask is how the prototypes are set. Aren't the prototypes actually some forms of ideals that have sprung out from relational concepts, as the French structualists have argued? It sounds like a chicken-and-egg problem, but maybe the real important thing is that the very aspiration of the current paradigm of classification to achieve some form of 'Aristotelean' categories.
Monday, March 05, 2007
History of VCR, User Culture
On reading Greenberg's account on the history of the VCR, I was pleasantly surprised that the whole process closely resembled what I have seen with the rise of the Internet. First, the technology is here. Then come the handful of enthusiastic people who find out new ways of use which is mediated among them into a new user culture. These unexpected novelty pisses off the bigger corporations, and they in turn attempt to restrict the technology and its specific use patterns through what they are good at: law and money. But at the same time, they quickly go about finding new ways to make commercial profit of the new user culture. And before you notice it, the commercialized 'system' becomes the default.
I completely agree on Greenberg's point that this whole process cannot be explained without looking into the in-between spaces and players. It is rather an interaction between technology, corporates, regulatory systems, and the complicated mixture of actual users. This interaction is the clue that leads to the answers of why some technologies are selected while others are dismissed. Why did the Laserdisc, which was more compliant to the aspirations of the movie corporates (e.g. better resolution, no wear-out for multiple playbacks, cannot duplicate) miserably fail to replace the VCR? The 'recording' function that connected the users closer to the TV culture and content sharing. Then why did the same concept succeed after a decade with the DVD? Probably (though not the sole reason) because the user culture itself had changed in some ways, incorporating experiences from other media such as the CD and Video game consoles.
But it calls for a practical question. Can the user culture - which is a sort of dialectic result between the (company) proposed use and (user) desired use - be effectively analyzed or even predicted? Is it the crucial driving force itself or should it rather be regarded as a surprise/noise factor that bring about the unexpected in the course of the history of media technology? Maybe a modification of Lessig's content regulating modalities (law, market, norms, architecture) would be useful, where a specific technology is socially selected by laws, markets, norms and 'user-culture'.
I completely agree on Greenberg's point that this whole process cannot be explained without looking into the in-between spaces and players. It is rather an interaction between technology, corporates, regulatory systems, and the complicated mixture of actual users. This interaction is the clue that leads to the answers of why some technologies are selected while others are dismissed. Why did the Laserdisc, which was more compliant to the aspirations of the movie corporates (e.g. better resolution, no wear-out for multiple playbacks, cannot duplicate) miserably fail to replace the VCR? The 'recording' function that connected the users closer to the TV culture and content sharing. Then why did the same concept succeed after a decade with the DVD? Probably (though not the sole reason) because the user culture itself had changed in some ways, incorporating experiences from other media such as the CD and Video game consoles.
But it calls for a practical question. Can the user culture - which is a sort of dialectic result between the (company) proposed use and (user) desired use - be effectively analyzed or even predicted? Is it the crucial driving force itself or should it rather be regarded as a surprise/noise factor that bring about the unexpected in the course of the history of media technology? Maybe a modification of Lessig's content regulating modalities (law, market, norms, architecture) would be useful, where a specific technology is socially selected by laws, markets, norms and 'user-culture'.
Monday, February 26, 2007
Cortada: industry changes
Cortada's pieces for this week are several parts of his bigger project on how the utilization of computers have changed the modern industry and the labor in it. Some questions on the reading:
In the summary to his ambitious series 'Digital hand', he looks into how the industry utilized computers rather than how they were provided (more or less in the same vein as Ensmenger last week, but with more focus on the actual industrial functions they did than identity construction). He emphasizes the role of the leading companies in the process, which have been maintaining oligopoly. The effect of contextual influence in a given industry sector is improtant in the spread of technology and the following social change. A form of peer effect, so to say, acts as the 'digital hand'. However, his position on the importance of that digital hand is not clear, when he both argues that "machines did not replace management", but also emphasizes the digital hand as almost deterministic in some points. So, how strong does he think the digital hand has been/is?
In the forthcoming piece 'Digital applications in higher education', he talks about why the academia did not positively incorporate computers into their system other than administrative matters. It rings a bell with Ensmenger's talk last week, when he argued that it depends on whether it suits with the established systems and goals, so as to strengthen their functions and productivity rather than reconstructing the whole and risking their jobs. However, I'm having a hard time agreeing with his view that academia has not been changed on the institutional level. True, there is still a tenure track system, grad school and semester system etc. But how fundamental is fundamental change? Research patterns have been significantly affected by the Internet and data processing power, student management and curriculum planning relies heavily on online resources, time and space of education has been altered. Even in the curriculum, it is hard to imagine the convergent academic programs of MIT's MediaLab without the influence of IT.
On the last reading, 'Progenitors of the information age', the most catching idea for me was the discussion on the relationship between American ideology and technological growth. The latter strives for social reform as the good based on the former. However, based on his historical accounts, it seems to me it is not that ideology bring about the development, but ideology is mobilized to justify the developments which are solely based on the strive for economic interests. I wish there was some more explanations that further elaborate on this ideology issue.
In the summary to his ambitious series 'Digital hand', he looks into how the industry utilized computers rather than how they were provided (more or less in the same vein as Ensmenger last week, but with more focus on the actual industrial functions they did than identity construction). He emphasizes the role of the leading companies in the process, which have been maintaining oligopoly. The effect of contextual influence in a given industry sector is improtant in the spread of technology and the following social change. A form of peer effect, so to say, acts as the 'digital hand'. However, his position on the importance of that digital hand is not clear, when he both argues that "machines did not replace management", but also emphasizes the digital hand as almost deterministic in some points. So, how strong does he think the digital hand has been/is?
In the forthcoming piece 'Digital applications in higher education', he talks about why the academia did not positively incorporate computers into their system other than administrative matters. It rings a bell with Ensmenger's talk last week, when he argued that it depends on whether it suits with the established systems and goals, so as to strengthen their functions and productivity rather than reconstructing the whole and risking their jobs. However, I'm having a hard time agreeing with his view that academia has not been changed on the institutional level. True, there is still a tenure track system, grad school and semester system etc. But how fundamental is fundamental change? Research patterns have been significantly affected by the Internet and data processing power, student management and curriculum planning relies heavily on online resources, time and space of education has been altered. Even in the curriculum, it is hard to imagine the convergent academic programs of MIT's MediaLab without the influence of IT.
On the last reading, 'Progenitors of the information age', the most catching idea for me was the discussion on the relationship between American ideology and technological growth. The latter strives for social reform as the good based on the former. However, based on his historical accounts, it seems to me it is not that ideology bring about the development, but ideology is mobilized to justify the developments which are solely based on the strive for economic interests. I wish there was some more explanations that further elaborate on this ideology issue.
Monday, February 19, 2007
Programming labor
Ensmenger takes us on a historical journey through the labor, pride and discursive struggle for social acceptance of professionalsm of the computer programmers. As such, the social status of programmers have been historically changing over time and were the results of social contexts such as the conflict between the management and the programming laborers. As a conclusion, Ensmenger argues that they are neither routinized laborers nor autonomous professionals (ULIR p.178) but technicians.
However, in my view it seems that today the labor range of programmers have become wider, so that some do routinized labor, while a few still are autonomous, and then again some technicians. Today they seem to exist simultaneously, as computers became more embedded and widespread in society and everyday life. With the widened range, it is hard to embrace all functions as one. There's the Wordpress that was 'created' by two guys, while many programmers spend their long hours mechanically building small pieces of modules for MS Windows without ever having control over the whole product (Fordism style - or 'Software factory', as Ensmenger calls it). As history goes forth, it is often the case that some of the different forms of discourses alongway accumulate to widen the overall scope of the concept, rather than undergoing a complete and uniform change.
And it would be not appropriate to say that programmers should be regarded only one way or another, because some programs require more management while othe programs need creativity. It is that programming has changed from the job itself to a specific skill needed to do a job. The relationship between the labor performance and the job becomes less tight.
However, in my view it seems that today the labor range of programmers have become wider, so that some do routinized labor, while a few still are autonomous, and then again some technicians. Today they seem to exist simultaneously, as computers became more embedded and widespread in society and everyday life. With the widened range, it is hard to embrace all functions as one. There's the Wordpress that was 'created' by two guys, while many programmers spend their long hours mechanically building small pieces of modules for MS Windows without ever having control over the whole product (Fordism style - or 'Software factory', as Ensmenger calls it). As history goes forth, it is often the case that some of the different forms of discourses alongway accumulate to widen the overall scope of the concept, rather than undergoing a complete and uniform change.
And it would be not appropriate to say that programmers should be regarded only one way or another, because some programs require more management while othe programs need creativity. It is that programming has changed from the job itself to a specific skill needed to do a job. The relationship between the labor performance and the job becomes less tight.
Monday, February 12, 2007
Why all the labor?
This week's reading deals with some nice and concrete case studies on how the changing social emphasis on information has changed the working lives of the people, especially the people working directly related to the very infrastructure of information technology. But even this involves a wide array of jobs, ranging from clerical works via programmers to cargo laborers.
Rosenhaft explores into the soaring labor of 19th century German clerical workers. Sampson and Wu look into the shipping laborers who get excluded from the whole work process of the shore due to more 'efficient' communication/transportation technologies. Benner looks into the works of ICT workers in the Silicon Valley as guilds, who are struggling to stay competent (that is, profitable) in this ever-changing environment. Postigo explains how the AOL volunteeres were dumped, because the coporation wanted more stable reorganization. Voluntary labor contribution becomes obsolete when the technology adjusts to the more formal aspects of the capitalistic market. Drawing from the cases, Downey concludes that 1) technological labor is needed to sustain labor-saving infrastructures, and 2) any changing technological division of labor involves social division 3) which leads to spatial/temporal divisions, and 4) their positions are understood in terms of cultural understandings.
A couple of questions occurred to me while making sense of the broad scope of the readings. First, as the title of the volume suggests, all of them attempt to uncover the many previously less-noticed labor processes involved in the so-called information revolutions. But they are mostly focused on how the more information technology-oriented environment changed the lives of the laborers, rather than looking into how such labors changed the way the technological infrastructures look. In a sense, even though the articles emphasize human labor, it looks like it is still the technology that shapes the changes. What possible routes of information technology have been taken 'because of' specific labor patterns? It is a question largely left out of the discussion.
Second, I would have liked to see some more insights into the reason 'why' labor is so hidden from our sights when talking about information revolutions. Why are we always implementing the technology itself as the unit of analysis rather than the labor relationships? (Have the Marxists completely given up their worldview?) What ideological backgrounds leads us to forget the obvious labor, and what concrete advantages do we have when we do acknowledge the role of labor? I think uncovering of labor processes can and should contribute to more than historical knowledge per se.
Rosenhaft explores into the soaring labor of 19th century German clerical workers. Sampson and Wu look into the shipping laborers who get excluded from the whole work process of the shore due to more 'efficient' communication/transportation technologies. Benner looks into the works of ICT workers in the Silicon Valley as guilds, who are struggling to stay competent (that is, profitable) in this ever-changing environment. Postigo explains how the AOL volunteeres were dumped, because the coporation wanted more stable reorganization. Voluntary labor contribution becomes obsolete when the technology adjusts to the more formal aspects of the capitalistic market. Drawing from the cases, Downey concludes that 1) technological labor is needed to sustain labor-saving infrastructures, and 2) any changing technological division of labor involves social division 3) which leads to spatial/temporal divisions, and 4) their positions are understood in terms of cultural understandings.
A couple of questions occurred to me while making sense of the broad scope of the readings. First, as the title of the volume suggests, all of them attempt to uncover the many previously less-noticed labor processes involved in the so-called information revolutions. But they are mostly focused on how the more information technology-oriented environment changed the lives of the laborers, rather than looking into how such labors changed the way the technological infrastructures look. In a sense, even though the articles emphasize human labor, it looks like it is still the technology that shapes the changes. What possible routes of information technology have been taken 'because of' specific labor patterns? It is a question largely left out of the discussion.
Second, I would have liked to see some more insights into the reason 'why' labor is so hidden from our sights when talking about information revolutions. Why are we always implementing the technology itself as the unit of analysis rather than the labor relationships? (Have the Marxists completely given up their worldview?) What ideological backgrounds leads us to forget the obvious labor, and what concrete advantages do we have when we do acknowledge the role of labor? I think uncovering of labor processes can and should contribute to more than historical knowledge per se.
Monday, February 05, 2007
The Network Society: Power of the Nodes.
Stalder's book is an elaborate and clear explanation of Castells' theory. And I must say, it was hard to do a critical reading of Stalder's book because the book itself is an extensive critical reading of Catells' theory. However, on relating this reading to our class I came upon a main question.
According to Castells, we are still in a era where the 'space of flows'("stage of human action whose dimensions are created by dynamic movement, rather than by static location") and 'space of places' coexist. The places that carry specific functions become nodes in the flow. As a result 'dual cities' emerge, where the dualities of information administrators and sweatshops exist simultaneously. If fits nicely with the documentary about Palo Alto we saw on the first week. However, Castells' theory of the network society is very skeptical about what we can do to bridge the gap between the dualities. Though he theorizes that the network consists of flow, media and nodes, his emphasis is mostly on the network and focuses less on the power of the 'nodes'(e.g. actors or places) to create the media and its flows. If the network society is indeed characterized by "the preeminence of social morphology over social action", couldn't it be understood that the social actions shape of the morphology? Flows are not inherent, but are caused by the power of the nodes. And the nodes vary in their power as well, and a force field arises where the intensity and direction of the flow is decided. Maybe there is some chance for social action and their activists in the network society after all.
Similar underestimations are also present in the notion of "network state", or nation-states as strategic actors(p105). To emphasize the network, Castells underestimates the state power that is still firmly in effect by means of media politics and international competition. Even structural violence is still in effect, as demonstrated in the Iraq invasion of 2003. Old powers may have faltered, but their functions are still there: and the pressure is heavier because of its perceived uncertainty.
Monday, January 29, 2007
Which modernity and which technology?
First, I am still struggling to define 'technology'. If I take the broad term so as to match the equally broad concept of 'modernity', technology could encompass all the mechanical inventions plus the social systems of communication, management, governance among others. But then, anything systematically constructed could be called technology which would make the definition too broad. Brey's notion of the micro-macro levels should not be applied to the social phenomenon only, but also the scope of technology (e.g. telecommunication technology in overall, or simply SMS). And in both areas, the various levels intersect and interact.
In this sense, one thing that can be easily overlooked is that it's not the broad terms of technology per se that characterized modernity, but the way some specific technologies were utilized. Murata's piece partly implies this subject by comparing modernization of Japan and China, but in most other chapters it is rather untouched. What specific forms of modernity has chosen to utilize some specific technologies while ruling out the others? It gets even more complicated if we take into account that there is not a single modernity, however broad we may want to define it. For example, there are huge differences between the 'Western' modernity that resulted from the Renaissance, enlightenment and capitalistic developments and the forced Westernization of the other parts of the world (Which again differs significantly among them). This notion is important not only in the philosophical sense, but that the social construction and values can differ. Different forms of values and labor relationships take place, and it inevitably results in different choice of technologies in each society or different use patterns of the same technology. Thus, I think the contextualization is the most crucial step that should be present when exploring into the interaction of technology in the modern life.
In this sense, one thing that can be easily overlooked is that it's not the broad terms of technology per se that characterized modernity, but the way some specific technologies were utilized. Murata's piece partly implies this subject by comparing modernization of Japan and China, but in most other chapters it is rather untouched. What specific forms of modernity has chosen to utilize some specific technologies while ruling out the others? It gets even more complicated if we take into account that there is not a single modernity, however broad we may want to define it. For example, there are huge differences between the 'Western' modernity that resulted from the Renaissance, enlightenment and capitalistic developments and the forced Westernization of the other parts of the world (Which again differs significantly among them). This notion is important not only in the philosophical sense, but that the social construction and values can differ. Different forms of values and labor relationships take place, and it inevitably results in different choice of technologies in each society or different use patterns of the same technology. Thus, I think the contextualization is the most crucial step that should be present when exploring into the interaction of technology in the modern life.
Sunday, January 28, 2007
LIS810
Starting off the semester. This is the blog of Nak ho Kim, for LIS810 responses and other trivial things.
Sunday, December 17, 2006
[Rn_Grp6] Wikipedia issue
The essential question that can be raised in the Wikipedia phenomenon is obvious: why does it work? This question is specifically this: why do people so passionately contributing tons of organized information voluntarily, spending a significant amount of their own time? Nobody pays them - no money nor credit. What could be the motivation system for them, and could it work for other things than a giant Internet encyclopedia and thus revolutionizing the very concept of information society itself?
My theoretical assumption is that it deals with the desire to take over the hegemony of the social knowledge system. The shift is from the small group of established experts to the more non-institutionalized people in general. They have the immense need (or the feeling of necessity) of the general public to (1) produce knowledge that was not considered to be worthy of being formalized into knowledge, and (2) participate into the process of production of social standard reference knowledge. The first element reflects its results on one of the characteristics of Wiki: a giant pool of trivia, especially on popular culture, tech geekery etc. The second element is evident in the open discussion pages and editing policies.
It means that there is the need to fill in the structural gap in the communication network of knowledge. The players existed and expanded, but their roles were excluded in the knowledge production system - now they want to fill in the hole. That explains in parts why Wikipedia is so popular while other projects of the Wikimedia experiences less general support (e.g. Wikinews, with only about 10 articles being updated daily). Simply accumulation of information does not provide motivation. It is the goal of filling up what should have been there, and setting a standard body of reference for a particular knowledge that gets motivates the contributors. At least that's my hypothesis, which I should be positively proving from here on... a long way to go.
[Rn_Grp5] Open source...
The ideal of open source is promising - common sharing of the production means, to use them according to own needs. It's the communists' dreams come true, in a good sense. Sharing the source code does not use up the original resource, and people can contribute to diversifying and updating the original. And by allowing commercialization of one's own version as well (except the core GNU believers in the tradition of Stallman), the contributers don't have to starve. As it was shown, it worked pretty well on Linux, Mozilla-based web browsers and countless other programs.
However, there is a fundamental limit to the applicability of the open source idea. The first is, that it does not work on areas where the source itself is the commodity. Rhetorically, open source is more like making the ingredients and the recipe public. The competent chef still can sell his skilled menu, or even get more rich and famous for it. However, it would not apply to a book publisher. By making the recipes free for public, he/she is deprived of his selling commodity, thus destined to starve or find another job. There are countless information related jobs that rely on the source as the commodity, such as news journalism. Programmers are more like chefs - their own expertise is the commodity. However, the enterpreneurs have to make money by selling the products, and do not want too many competitors with similar concepts. Then, the problem becomes what should be regarded as commodity and what should not be utilized as them. A hard struggle, in this hyper-modern capitalist world where everything eventually turns into commodities.
However, there is a fundamental limit to the applicability of the open source idea. The first is, that it does not work on areas where the source itself is the commodity. Rhetorically, open source is more like making the ingredients and the recipe public. The competent chef still can sell his skilled menu, or even get more rich and famous for it. However, it would not apply to a book publisher. By making the recipes free for public, he/she is deprived of his selling commodity, thus destined to starve or find another job. There are countless information related jobs that rely on the source as the commodity, such as news journalism. Programmers are more like chefs - their own expertise is the commodity. However, the enterpreneurs have to make money by selling the products, and do not want too many competitors with similar concepts. Then, the problem becomes what should be regarded as commodity and what should not be utilized as them. A hard struggle, in this hyper-modern capitalist world where everything eventually turns into commodities.
Wednesday, December 06, 2006
[RN_Grp4] bloggers, journalists
A simple premise: most bloggers are not journalists, but the reader doesn't care. As long as it looks informative and/or shows (or even strengthens) some empathy to my views. Newsworthiness for the humble reader is that simple, as apart from what the jornalists would like to think. Things like objectivity and crediblility are some nice options to make the news more newsworthy, but other 'virtues' such as empathy and sheer speed of the information can outweigh them in some contexts. The overall news discourse space of a society overarches the whole array ranging from the gossips to the journalistic articles to deeper formal analysis. While traditional journalism specialized itself to the narrow array of the standardarized news article, bloggers are all over the spectrum.
Thus, it is not the case that 'blogs' are some things or not. Blogs are just a form of networked communication (fundamentally, it is nothing more than just an easy-to-update webpage!), that has become so technically sophisticated that it can also be used for functions that was thought before to be only possible for trained journalists in a solid commercial media organization. Rather, it is the use pattern of the blog writers/readers that is to put focus on. The role of social news and opinion production has been spread to a wider pool of its members. It is no threat to the readers, only to the journalists.
Thus, it is not the case that 'blogs' are some things or not. Blogs are just a form of networked communication (fundamentally, it is nothing more than just an easy-to-update webpage!), that has become so technically sophisticated that it can also be used for functions that was thought before to be only possible for trained journalists in a solid commercial media organization. Rather, it is the use pattern of the blog writers/readers that is to put focus on. The role of social news and opinion production has been spread to a wider pool of its members. It is no threat to the readers, only to the journalists.
[RN_Grp3] Copyrights
Zune, Microsoft's futile attempt to dent the iPod empire, recently hit the stores.
1) Its main offer to the users: the music sharing function ('Welcome to the social"). A nice idea, regarding the sharing culture of the younger Internet generations. However, the function turned out to be frustrating. You can download a song from a peer's machine, but the song will last only three plays or three days whichever comes first. After that, the file self-destructs, leaving only a ad tag that indicates you should buy it if you liked it.
2) Then, the card it offered to the industry: give Universal records $1 for each machine sold. The record companies have long been asking Apple to share the hardware sales profit with them, in vain. Now Microsoft kisses their backs. I wonder how Microsoft will deal with all the other numerous record companies.
Both instances indicate the ridiculous outcomes, if you want to exploit old-fashioned copyright concepts and at the same time pretend to be up-to-date. In the former, even the self-recorded garage band demos cannot be effectively shared and spread through the Net - that is, you do not have the ability to control your own copyright. In the latter case, Microsoft is paying a mutated form of 'copyright fee' to the record company for making their music available on their machine, by providing them with a fee for sales of a machine that the company does not have anything to do with.
Copyright, like all the other individual rights, become laughable caricatures of their original intent if left without proper restrictions. In a country where Disney successfully modifies the laws over and over again to prevent Mickey Mouse from coming into the public domain forever, it can be safely said that such restrictions are largely lacking. If the law does not provide the restrictions, the user practices and common sense should step into play. It is the gap that must be bridged, between the already present structure of networked information use by the general users and the commercial industry system that would rather like to stick to the old days where you could sell... Vinyl records and stuff.
1) Its main offer to the users: the music sharing function ('Welcome to the social"). A nice idea, regarding the sharing culture of the younger Internet generations. However, the function turned out to be frustrating. You can download a song from a peer's machine, but the song will last only three plays or three days whichever comes first. After that, the file self-destructs, leaving only a ad tag that indicates you should buy it if you liked it.
2) Then, the card it offered to the industry: give Universal records $1 for each machine sold. The record companies have long been asking Apple to share the hardware sales profit with them, in vain. Now Microsoft kisses their backs. I wonder how Microsoft will deal with all the other numerous record companies.
Both instances indicate the ridiculous outcomes, if you want to exploit old-fashioned copyright concepts and at the same time pretend to be up-to-date. In the former, even the self-recorded garage band demos cannot be effectively shared and spread through the Net - that is, you do not have the ability to control your own copyright. In the latter case, Microsoft is paying a mutated form of 'copyright fee' to the record company for making their music available on their machine, by providing them with a fee for sales of a machine that the company does not have anything to do with.
Copyright, like all the other individual rights, become laughable caricatures of their original intent if left without proper restrictions. In a country where Disney successfully modifies the laws over and over again to prevent Mickey Mouse from coming into the public domain forever, it can be safely said that such restrictions are largely lacking. If the law does not provide the restrictions, the user practices and common sense should step into play. It is the gap that must be bridged, between the already present structure of networked information use by the general users and the commercial industry system that would rather like to stick to the old days where you could sell... Vinyl records and stuff.
Wednesday, November 29, 2006
[RN_Grp2] Net Neutrality...
Free and open information flow rests on a crucial foundation: equal access. Luckily, the creators of the Internet had this in mind and took care of it by building an open and decentralized network where anybody with a server and line can jump in. The address system they invented also provides equal access, unless you are a client while your server filters some particular ones out. Everybody can be equally connected to anybody else, that was the premise.
But the commercial interests of a capitalist society rests upon the concept of differentiation. To provide something special for some more money, and provide something crappy for less money, thus motivating people to spend more. Since the Internet structure itself cannot be profoundly changed now (though there are constantly attempts to do that), there is only one other way left for differentiation of access: slow down the line for some, make it faster for others. To hell with the net neutrality principle, that was in the world since radio and telephone.
Unlike the server hosting market where it is a fully competitive market, the ISP market is an oligopoly. It requires a lot of capital and time to construct the infrastructure. So users, server managers and Internet companies do not have much alternative than following the rules of the ISPs. Information society for sure, but still the ones with the capital can control the information flow. Without net neutrality, even more so.
However, it does not necessarily mean that now all Internet access is of the same speed. There are servers that could afford only a smaller bandwidth, slower server computers with outdated DB programs, or simply have no other choice than to be routed through some slow switches (such as servers in far away countries). There already have been differences on the server side for mostly commercial reasons, and now the ISPs want to implement differences themselves for their commercial interests. Probably, people will be able to buy faster connection speeds from the ISPs, just as people can buy faster servers, programs and bandwidth now. I'm not saying that net neutrality is unimportant, but that we shouldn't forget that even with the net neutality principle we are already somewhat short of the ideals of equal access. There's a lot more to be done.
But the commercial interests of a capitalist society rests upon the concept of differentiation. To provide something special for some more money, and provide something crappy for less money, thus motivating people to spend more. Since the Internet structure itself cannot be profoundly changed now (though there are constantly attempts to do that), there is only one other way left for differentiation of access: slow down the line for some, make it faster for others. To hell with the net neutrality principle, that was in the world since radio and telephone.
Unlike the server hosting market where it is a fully competitive market, the ISP market is an oligopoly. It requires a lot of capital and time to construct the infrastructure. So users, server managers and Internet companies do not have much alternative than following the rules of the ISPs. Information society for sure, but still the ones with the capital can control the information flow. Without net neutrality, even more so.
However, it does not necessarily mean that now all Internet access is of the same speed. There are servers that could afford only a smaller bandwidth, slower server computers with outdated DB programs, or simply have no other choice than to be routed through some slow switches (such as servers in far away countries). There already have been differences on the server side for mostly commercial reasons, and now the ISPs want to implement differences themselves for their commercial interests. Probably, people will be able to buy faster connection speeds from the ISPs, just as people can buy faster servers, programs and bandwidth now. I'm not saying that net neutrality is unimportant, but that we shouldn't forget that even with the net neutality principle we are already somewhat short of the ideals of equal access. There's a lot more to be done.
[RN_Grp1] Patriot Act...
It is very difficult not to go crazy, having faced an unexpected threat to life (how exaggerated it may be). In the wake of 9/11, Sen. Feingold was the sole person sane enough to oppose an absurd restriction to civil liberty of free expression. As he notes, free speech is the foundation of American democracy. It is not some kind of measure that can be compromised for a bigger goal, because it is the very value that the policies seek to protect. And free expression can only function when it is not intimidated by extraordinary surveillance and the resulting punishment. Though not directly prohibiting free expression itself, it has the power to clog the information flow by making people self-censor.
However, let's leave all the civil liberties talk and privacy matter aside, since it's so obvious anyway. My question is, where will a regime run by information surveillance ultimately lead to? Surveillance from the government, if known to the public, can prime a domino of many surveillances. If somebody can always intercepts my communication and make backups of it to use it against me, then I must also make my own backups of everything so that there can be no faked data. Even when implementing ways to obscure my own communication traces, my backups must exist just in case. And the commercial sectors will also want to make use of (more) surveillance, since surveillance is being justified as something necessary rather than an intrusion to privacy. The results? A bureaucracy hell where everybody starts recording everything for no particular reason.
Of course the imminent intrusion to privacy and civil liberties is a profound matter. But the long aspect of the PATRIOT act can be that unlimited surveillance itself will be regarded as something natural, to be followed by everyone.
Monday, November 20, 2006
How I stopped my feed (and fought withdrawal symptoms)
The assignment for this week: to stop one of the information feed s that one has been relying on for more than 24 hours, and to report on what happened. A tough quest, I must say, for a serious information addict like me.
The first thing to do was to select which feed to cut off. But what is a feed? it is not simply information per se, but information that is selected and given to me, according to what the feeders argue to be the things that I want. Thus, it is not what I actually search for, but what I am supposed to long for. Of course it is not something that is one-sidedly, but an analysis based on the information of my taste that I have given them - or at least left traces on their system. A feed is something that I have taken part in, more or less voluntarily. Let's think what kinds of such feeds I have on my daily basis... email, that's for sure. An email account for personal matters from Korea, one for personal matters from US, one for academic stuff. Then there's the news syndication feed. Google news for international news, Naver news for Korean ones. And there are at least a dozen blogs I visit everyday. Since I enjoy browsing around, I don't use my RSS reader often - but this is still a kind of regular information feed for my way of living. Amazon, Ebay and all the other stores that provide me with personalized 'choices'. It's not that I buy from them everyday, but it is a nice entertainment just to browse around what the stores and people have to offer, a kind of cyber eye-shopping. Also part of my daily routine.
Okay, back to the task... which one should I cut off? First, I cut off the Google News. But after a couple of hours, it made no sense. If I cut off one feed, there are always so many alternative feeds. Yahoo news, for example. Cut off all kinds of Internet newsfeeds? there is still the vast array daily newspaper that can be red in the Journalism Reading Room. And, there's the TV. It is not a single feed, but the whole media sphere of information feeds that one is dependent on. My first lesson.
How about feeds that have less alternatives, say Amazon? Yes, NOT visiting Amazon made me feel uncomfortable the first day. Then, it sent me an email with the list in it. I deleted it. Now, an email from Amazon Japan with my 'preferences'. Also deleted it. Need to focus... so I browsed Google Scholar for some papers I needed to read for another class. Oh, there seems to be an extensive review on the book that the researcher had done. Without paying much attention, I clicked on it. Voila. Amazon pops up. Hey, the feeds are so much interconnected so that one cannot completely shut just one particular thing off. My second lesson.
How about getting more radical? Something like... not turning on the Outlook Express for a day - no, for half a day for a starter. That should be manageable, since people usually sleep for some hours a day anyway. Okay, no email. Well, after some hours I received a call saying "I sent you an email, and wasn't sure if you'd received it." My third lesson: the information feed cannot be shut off by me alone. It is mutual in some sense.
All in all, information feeds are embedded into my daily lifestyle of receiving information in such a complex way so that it is virtually impossible to cut it off without changing my way of thinking and living itself. And I'm pretty sure that I won't be able to change that so easily either, without changing some significant portions of my social surroundings as well. c'est la vie.
The first thing to do was to select which feed to cut off. But what is a feed? it is not simply information per se, but information that is selected and given to me, according to what the feeders argue to be the things that I want. Thus, it is not what I actually search for, but what I am supposed to long for. Of course it is not something that is one-sidedly, but an analysis based on the information of my taste that I have given them - or at least left traces on their system. A feed is something that I have taken part in, more or less voluntarily. Let's think what kinds of such feeds I have on my daily basis... email, that's for sure. An email account for personal matters from Korea, one for personal matters from US, one for academic stuff. Then there's the news syndication feed. Google news for international news, Naver news for Korean ones. And there are at least a dozen blogs I visit everyday. Since I enjoy browsing around, I don't use my RSS reader often - but this is still a kind of regular information feed for my way of living. Amazon, Ebay and all the other stores that provide me with personalized 'choices'. It's not that I buy from them everyday, but it is a nice entertainment just to browse around what the stores and people have to offer, a kind of cyber eye-shopping. Also part of my daily routine.
Okay, back to the task... which one should I cut off? First, I cut off the Google News. But after a couple of hours, it made no sense. If I cut off one feed, there are always so many alternative feeds. Yahoo news, for example. Cut off all kinds of Internet newsfeeds? there is still the vast array daily newspaper that can be red in the Journalism Reading Room. And, there's the TV. It is not a single feed, but the whole media sphere of information feeds that one is dependent on. My first lesson.
How about feeds that have less alternatives, say Amazon? Yes, NOT visiting Amazon made me feel uncomfortable the first day. Then, it sent me an email with the list in it. I deleted it. Now, an email from Amazon Japan with my 'preferences'. Also deleted it. Need to focus... so I browsed Google Scholar for some papers I needed to read for another class. Oh, there seems to be an extensive review on the book that the researcher had done. Without paying much attention, I clicked on it. Voila. Amazon pops up. Hey, the feeds are so much interconnected so that one cannot completely shut just one particular thing off. My second lesson.
How about getting more radical? Something like... not turning on the Outlook Express for a day - no, for half a day for a starter. That should be manageable, since people usually sleep for some hours a day anyway. Okay, no email. Well, after some hours I received a call saying "I sent you an email, and wasn't sure if you'd received it." My third lesson: the information feed cannot be shut off by me alone. It is mutual in some sense.
All in all, information feeds are embedded into my daily lifestyle of receiving information in such a complex way so that it is virtually impossible to cut it off without changing my way of thinking and living itself. And I'm pretty sure that I won't be able to change that so easily either, without changing some significant portions of my social surroundings as well. c'est la vie.
Wednesday, November 15, 2006
[Week 11] FEED
MT Anderson's 'Feed' is a great novel to summarize a good deal of the Information Society Reader we have covered during this semester. It is a kind of "Clockwork Orange meets Neuromancer meets Futurama". Though the author extensively warns the commercialization of information that govern everything in our daily lives, the really important notion of his vision is that (almost) everybody is perfectly content with it. This could be effectively shown by laying out the whole story in the protagonist's view. Nobody does, or can, raise any question about the commercial information regime any more.
Would it be possible to resist - or at least reconsider - that huge inevitable mainstream of voluntary stupidity? Well, the author is not very optimistic about it, and does not hesitate to kill off the only sane protogonist at the end of the story. In fact, he does not suggest any concrete idea to topple at least a fraction of it, unlike the predecessors of cyberpunk. But then again, most of the researches we have been reading in the book were not different. Describing the problems, invoking the need for reconsideration, but that's pretty much it. No experiments of e-democracy, no account on the rare moments of civic success in the online struggle against the commercial or governmental sector. Maybe we'll have to anticipate for a sequel to the book - maybe it could be titled 'Feed 2.0 - The Revolution of Titus' or something like that.
Would it be possible to resist - or at least reconsider - that huge inevitable mainstream of voluntary stupidity? Well, the author is not very optimistic about it, and does not hesitate to kill off the only sane protogonist at the end of the story. In fact, he does not suggest any concrete idea to topple at least a fraction of it, unlike the predecessors of cyberpunk. But then again, most of the researches we have been reading in the book were not different. Describing the problems, invoking the need for reconsideration, but that's pretty much it. No experiments of e-democracy, no account on the rare moments of civic success in the online struggle against the commercial or governmental sector. Maybe we'll have to anticipate for a sequel to the book - maybe it could be titled 'Feed 2.0 - The Revolution of Titus' or something like that.
Monday, November 13, 2006
[Week 11] Virtualities
This week's reading deals with how information technologies shape or alter traditional concepts of social identities such as gender, the 'self', and ethnic culture. Poster's article on the post-modernity and the decentralized fleeting identity is a typical approach to this. And a decade after his words, much of his theories have become commonplace. In Wikis where people have collaborative knowledge building systems completely devoid of personal identities, and in blogs where individuals strive to become instant celebrities among the vast mass of indistinguishable users. Though Poster does not talk about how resistance is possible in this kind of information dominance, I think the decentralized nature of this space already has the necessary elements. Whether people care to find them is not merely dependent upon information technology, but proper social education.
Eric Michaels' piece explores the cultural identity changes that went on with the introduction of vast new information flows. However, I think the crucial thing was not information per se, but whose information it was. In this case, it was the Western viewpoints on a large scale that overflooded the lifeworld of the natives. They were put to view themselves through other's eyes, which separated their identities from their world. The quest is to find out how mediated information and the actual lifeworld can be integrated into a organic whole.
Sadie's piece is less theoretically intriguing, but an inportant historical recap nonetheless. Though she focuses on the role of the females in the information technology, the same could be applied to a whole set of other identity clusters such as 'third-world' programmers, unknown websurfers for Yahoo! during its initial days, and so on. After all, Information technonogy is characterized by the white smart Sillicon Valley male programmer-enterpreneur image, marginalizing everybody else. If the information society is to affect the whole society, all the social identities in this society has its unique share in it.
Thursday, November 09, 2006
[week 9_2... in fact, week 10?] Latter half of Bimber.
Bimber is a careful person - he simply does not overreach. Though he lays out the pattern of the information revolution and other valuable breakthrough findings in the first part, he says in the latter part of the book that it won't alter significantly the level of civic participation and political knowledge of the individuals living in that society. The possibilities of a more informed participation is balanced by the disengagement and disinterest. Information technology enables individualization, which is good in the making one's voice heard but disables the common experience that is crucial for the public-ness.
But to look deeper, it is not simply individualization (disguised as the rather positive-sounding term 'personalization') in itself that is the concern. It is the gap between the social system of modern democracy that needs some forms of common public-ness to function and the consuming desire that wants to put on sophisticated / differentiated identities. Because of this gap, people are constantly confused on which level of collectiveness they should put their values on. Can this gap be bridged? At least not by mere information technology per se, for sure.
But to look deeper, it is not simply individualization (disguised as the rather positive-sounding term 'personalization') in itself that is the concern. It is the gap between the social system of modern democracy that needs some forms of common public-ness to function and the consuming desire that wants to put on sophisticated / differentiated identities. Because of this gap, people are constantly confused on which level of collectiveness they should put their values on. Can this gap be bridged? At least not by mere information technology per se, for sure.
Monday, November 06, 2006
[Week 9_1] How about information against democracy?
In this book, Mimber talks about how major information technology changes brought about particular aspects of the democratic political systems, such as majoritarian, interest-group, market-driven, and post-bureaucratic ones. A valuable insight indeed, if we consider the fact that the information flow has always been a huge factor on how people organize themselves to make make political decisions.
The author is careful in making bold statements. He wants to avoid both technological determinism and social construction by simply not jumping into those. However, he has a strong opinion that the information technology has contributed to some forms of democracy. I wonder what he would say of instances and forces that are to the opposite: information technologies contributing to political stupidification of the individual, government control over the masses and so on. Although even those things are also conducted on the premise of democracy, it leads to less power of the people in general. I hope there are some answers to this in the latter half.
The author is careful in making bold statements. He wants to avoid both technological determinism and social construction by simply not jumping into those. However, he has a strong opinion that the information technology has contributed to some forms of democracy. I wonder what he would say of instances and forces that are to the opposite: information technologies contributing to political stupidification of the individual, government control over the masses and so on. Although even those things are also conducted on the premise of democracy, it leads to less power of the people in general. I hope there are some answers to this in the latter half.
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