Cortada's pieces for this week are several parts of his bigger project on how the utilization of computers have changed the modern industry and the labor in it. Some questions on the reading:
In the summary to his ambitious series 'Digital hand', he looks into how the industry utilized computers rather than how they were provided (more or less in the same vein as Ensmenger last week, but with more focus on the actual industrial functions they did than identity construction). He emphasizes the role of the leading companies in the process, which have been maintaining oligopoly. The effect of contextual influence in a given industry sector is improtant in the spread of technology and the following social change. A form of peer effect, so to say, acts as the 'digital hand'. However, his position on the importance of that digital hand is not clear, when he both argues that "machines did not replace management", but also emphasizes the digital hand as almost deterministic in some points. So, how strong does he think the digital hand has been/is?
In the forthcoming piece 'Digital applications in higher education', he talks about why the academia did not positively incorporate computers into their system other than administrative matters. It rings a bell with Ensmenger's talk last week, when he argued that it depends on whether it suits with the established systems and goals, so as to strengthen their functions and productivity rather than reconstructing the whole and risking their jobs. However, I'm having a hard time agreeing with his view that academia has not been changed on the institutional level. True, there is still a tenure track system, grad school and semester system etc. But how fundamental is fundamental change? Research patterns have been significantly affected by the Internet and data processing power, student management and curriculum planning relies heavily on online resources, time and space of education has been altered. Even in the curriculum, it is hard to imagine the convergent academic programs of MIT's MediaLab without the influence of IT.
On the last reading, 'Progenitors of the information age', the most catching idea for me was the discussion on the relationship between American ideology and technological growth. The latter strives for social reform as the good based on the former. However, based on his historical accounts, it seems to me it is not that ideology bring about the development, but ideology is mobilized to justify the developments which are solely based on the strive for economic interests. I wish there was some more explanations that further elaborate on this ideology issue.
Monday, February 26, 2007
Monday, February 19, 2007
Programming labor
Ensmenger takes us on a historical journey through the labor, pride and discursive struggle for social acceptance of professionalsm of the computer programmers. As such, the social status of programmers have been historically changing over time and were the results of social contexts such as the conflict between the management and the programming laborers. As a conclusion, Ensmenger argues that they are neither routinized laborers nor autonomous professionals (ULIR p.178) but technicians.
However, in my view it seems that today the labor range of programmers have become wider, so that some do routinized labor, while a few still are autonomous, and then again some technicians. Today they seem to exist simultaneously, as computers became more embedded and widespread in society and everyday life. With the widened range, it is hard to embrace all functions as one. There's the Wordpress that was 'created' by two guys, while many programmers spend their long hours mechanically building small pieces of modules for MS Windows without ever having control over the whole product (Fordism style - or 'Software factory', as Ensmenger calls it). As history goes forth, it is often the case that some of the different forms of discourses alongway accumulate to widen the overall scope of the concept, rather than undergoing a complete and uniform change.
And it would be not appropriate to say that programmers should be regarded only one way or another, because some programs require more management while othe programs need creativity. It is that programming has changed from the job itself to a specific skill needed to do a job. The relationship between the labor performance and the job becomes less tight.
However, in my view it seems that today the labor range of programmers have become wider, so that some do routinized labor, while a few still are autonomous, and then again some technicians. Today they seem to exist simultaneously, as computers became more embedded and widespread in society and everyday life. With the widened range, it is hard to embrace all functions as one. There's the Wordpress that was 'created' by two guys, while many programmers spend their long hours mechanically building small pieces of modules for MS Windows without ever having control over the whole product (Fordism style - or 'Software factory', as Ensmenger calls it). As history goes forth, it is often the case that some of the different forms of discourses alongway accumulate to widen the overall scope of the concept, rather than undergoing a complete and uniform change.
And it would be not appropriate to say that programmers should be regarded only one way or another, because some programs require more management while othe programs need creativity. It is that programming has changed from the job itself to a specific skill needed to do a job. The relationship between the labor performance and the job becomes less tight.
Monday, February 12, 2007
Why all the labor?
This week's reading deals with some nice and concrete case studies on how the changing social emphasis on information has changed the working lives of the people, especially the people working directly related to the very infrastructure of information technology. But even this involves a wide array of jobs, ranging from clerical works via programmers to cargo laborers.
Rosenhaft explores into the soaring labor of 19th century German clerical workers. Sampson and Wu look into the shipping laborers who get excluded from the whole work process of the shore due to more 'efficient' communication/transportation technologies. Benner looks into the works of ICT workers in the Silicon Valley as guilds, who are struggling to stay competent (that is, profitable) in this ever-changing environment. Postigo explains how the AOL volunteeres were dumped, because the coporation wanted more stable reorganization. Voluntary labor contribution becomes obsolete when the technology adjusts to the more formal aspects of the capitalistic market. Drawing from the cases, Downey concludes that 1) technological labor is needed to sustain labor-saving infrastructures, and 2) any changing technological division of labor involves social division 3) which leads to spatial/temporal divisions, and 4) their positions are understood in terms of cultural understandings.
A couple of questions occurred to me while making sense of the broad scope of the readings. First, as the title of the volume suggests, all of them attempt to uncover the many previously less-noticed labor processes involved in the so-called information revolutions. But they are mostly focused on how the more information technology-oriented environment changed the lives of the laborers, rather than looking into how such labors changed the way the technological infrastructures look. In a sense, even though the articles emphasize human labor, it looks like it is still the technology that shapes the changes. What possible routes of information technology have been taken 'because of' specific labor patterns? It is a question largely left out of the discussion.
Second, I would have liked to see some more insights into the reason 'why' labor is so hidden from our sights when talking about information revolutions. Why are we always implementing the technology itself as the unit of analysis rather than the labor relationships? (Have the Marxists completely given up their worldview?) What ideological backgrounds leads us to forget the obvious labor, and what concrete advantages do we have when we do acknowledge the role of labor? I think uncovering of labor processes can and should contribute to more than historical knowledge per se.
Rosenhaft explores into the soaring labor of 19th century German clerical workers. Sampson and Wu look into the shipping laborers who get excluded from the whole work process of the shore due to more 'efficient' communication/transportation technologies. Benner looks into the works of ICT workers in the Silicon Valley as guilds, who are struggling to stay competent (that is, profitable) in this ever-changing environment. Postigo explains how the AOL volunteeres were dumped, because the coporation wanted more stable reorganization. Voluntary labor contribution becomes obsolete when the technology adjusts to the more formal aspects of the capitalistic market. Drawing from the cases, Downey concludes that 1) technological labor is needed to sustain labor-saving infrastructures, and 2) any changing technological division of labor involves social division 3) which leads to spatial/temporal divisions, and 4) their positions are understood in terms of cultural understandings.
A couple of questions occurred to me while making sense of the broad scope of the readings. First, as the title of the volume suggests, all of them attempt to uncover the many previously less-noticed labor processes involved in the so-called information revolutions. But they are mostly focused on how the more information technology-oriented environment changed the lives of the laborers, rather than looking into how such labors changed the way the technological infrastructures look. In a sense, even though the articles emphasize human labor, it looks like it is still the technology that shapes the changes. What possible routes of information technology have been taken 'because of' specific labor patterns? It is a question largely left out of the discussion.
Second, I would have liked to see some more insights into the reason 'why' labor is so hidden from our sights when talking about information revolutions. Why are we always implementing the technology itself as the unit of analysis rather than the labor relationships? (Have the Marxists completely given up their worldview?) What ideological backgrounds leads us to forget the obvious labor, and what concrete advantages do we have when we do acknowledge the role of labor? I think uncovering of labor processes can and should contribute to more than historical knowledge per se.
Monday, February 05, 2007
The Network Society: Power of the Nodes.
Stalder's book is an elaborate and clear explanation of Castells' theory. And I must say, it was hard to do a critical reading of Stalder's book because the book itself is an extensive critical reading of Catells' theory. However, on relating this reading to our class I came upon a main question.
According to Castells, we are still in a era where the 'space of flows'("stage of human action whose dimensions are created by dynamic movement, rather than by static location") and 'space of places' coexist. The places that carry specific functions become nodes in the flow. As a result 'dual cities' emerge, where the dualities of information administrators and sweatshops exist simultaneously. If fits nicely with the documentary about Palo Alto we saw on the first week. However, Castells' theory of the network society is very skeptical about what we can do to bridge the gap between the dualities. Though he theorizes that the network consists of flow, media and nodes, his emphasis is mostly on the network and focuses less on the power of the 'nodes'(e.g. actors or places) to create the media and its flows. If the network society is indeed characterized by "the preeminence of social morphology over social action", couldn't it be understood that the social actions shape of the morphology? Flows are not inherent, but are caused by the power of the nodes. And the nodes vary in their power as well, and a force field arises where the intensity and direction of the flow is decided. Maybe there is some chance for social action and their activists in the network society after all.
Similar underestimations are also present in the notion of "network state", or nation-states as strategic actors(p105). To emphasize the network, Castells underestimates the state power that is still firmly in effect by means of media politics and international competition. Even structural violence is still in effect, as demonstrated in the Iraq invasion of 2003. Old powers may have faltered, but their functions are still there: and the pressure is heavier because of its perceived uncertainty.
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